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22 F3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
FACTS
On January 17, 1988, Mario Gonzalez-Rivera
(Gonzalez) and his father were travelling to work
on Interstate Highway 805 in California. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) officers in a
roving Border Patrol car pulled them over. The Bor-
der Patrol officers released the father because he had
documentation of legal residence in the United
States. The officers arrested Gonzalez, who had no
such documentation. A non-citizen who cannot
prove legal residence is subject to immediate de-
portation, unless the individual requests a deporta-
tion hearing. Gonzalez requested a deportation hear-
ing.
At the hearing, Gonzalez contested
deportability, and moved to suppress all evidence
that resulted from the stop. Gonzalez argued that
the stop was illegal because the sole basis for the
stop was his Hispanic appearance. The INS filed an
opposition to the motion to suppress evidence.
During the deportation hearing, the arresting
Border Patrol officers testified about the stop. Of-
ficer Wilson described Interstate Highway 805 as a
major alien smuggling route. He also testified that
almost everyone on that highway is of Hispanic de-
scent. Wilson testified that there was nothing inher-
ently suspicious about the car or the way that
Gonzalez' father was driving. Wilson stated that he
based his decision to stop the car on five factors: 1)
Gonzalez and his father appeared to be Hispanic;
2) both of them sat up straight, looked straight ahead
and did not turn their heads to acknowledge the
Border Patrol car; 3) Gonzalez' mouth appeared to
be dry; 4) Gonzalez was blinking; and 5) both men
appeared to be nervous. He added that Gonzalez
was wearing a cap, and I realize that, you know, ev-
I Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 .3d 1441, 1444 (9th
Cir. 1994).
2 U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
erybody who is wearing a cap is not an illegal alien,
but all these facts put together, seem to indicate
articulable facts... to make a reasonable stop."'
The Inmigration Judge (U) found that the sole
basis for the stop was Gonzalez' Hispanic appear-
ance. The stop, therefore, was an egregious Fourth
Amendment violation.2 The U granted the motion
to suppress the 1-213 Form and Officer Wilson's
testimony.
3
The INS appealed the U's decision to the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The INS argued that
Gonzalez' Hispanic appearance was not the sole basis
for the stop; but, even if it was, that such a stop was
not an egregious Fourth Amendment violation. The
INS also contended that Gonzalez had not presented
a prima facie case of a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion.
The BIA reversed the U's decision and found
that Hispanic appearance was not the sole basis for
the stop, but did not decide whether or not a purely
race-based stop would have constituted an egregious
violation of Gonzalez' Fourth Amendment rights.
The BIA also held that Gonzalez had failed to
present a prima facie case because he had not in-
cluded a statement or testimony on his own behalf
The BIA granted a thirty day voluntary departure-
to Gonzalez.
Gonzalez appealed the BIA decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit, in a split decision, reversed
the decision of the BIA, holding that the sole basis
for the stop was Gonzalez' Hispanic appearance, that
the stop was an egregious violation of Gonzalez'
Fourth Amendment rights, and that the exclusion-
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
3 An INS 1-213 Form, entitled "Record of Deport-
able Alien," is a document that includes all information
that an INS officer obtains from a border patrol stop.
Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 E3d at 1443.
ary rule applied.4 The Ninth Circuit also held that
the INS claim of defects in Gonzalez' prima fade
case was untimely and that the BIA should not have
considered the claim.5 The court decided this case
was distinguishable from INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,6




I. Exclusionary Rule in Civil Proceedings
The issue in this case is whether a court can
apply the exclusionary in a civil deportation hear-
ing. The Ninth Circuit ruled in Gonzalez-Rivera that
a court could use the exclusionary rule because the
Fourth Amendment violation in question was egre-
gious. In reaching this decision, the Gonzalez-Rivera
court relied on dicta found in Lopez-Mendoza."
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme Court, in a five
to four decision, held that a court could not apply
the exclusionary rule in a deportation hearing. A
deportation hearing, the Court concluded, was a civil
action because deportation is not punishment.9
The Lopez-Mendoza Court using the cost-ben-
efit analysis developed in US. v. Janis,"' determined
that the social benefits of exclusion of unlawfully
obtained evidence must be weighed against the so-
cial costs of such exclusion." In discussing the ben-
efits of the exclusionary rule, the Lopez-Mendoza
Court quoted Janis: "[T]he 'prime purpose' of the
rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful
police conduct.""2 Costs are the loss of probative
evidence and the "less accurate or more cumbersome
adjudication" resulting from exclusion of evidence.'3
The Lopez-Mendoza Court held that the cost of
excluded evidence in deportation hearings normally
outweighs the benefit of deterrence. First, the use
of the exclusionary rule would complicate the de-
4 Id. at 1452.
, id.
6 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
7 Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1451-1452.
8 Id. The only other circuit, besides the Ninth Cir-
cuit, to consider the egregious violation "exception" is the
Fourth Circuit in two unpublished dispositions. See
Samuels v. INS, No. 92-2484, 1993 WL 168938, at *1
(4th Cir. May 20, 1993)(recognizing the egregious viola-
tion exception, but finding no egregious violation);
Odukwe v. INS, No. 92-1037, 1992 WL 301941, at *1
(4th Cir. Oct. 22, 19 9 2)(same). It does not appear, there-
fore, that there are any cases that run counter to the Ninth
Circuit's application of this "exception."
" Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
10 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
liberately simple proceedings designed to expedite the
numerous deportation hearings that occur annually. 4
Second, the exclusionary rule would place a heavy
administrative burden on investigators who arrest sev-
eral aliens each day.' s Third, the courts might apply
the rule too broadly, excluding lawfully obtained evi-
dence. 6 Finally, application of the exclusionary rule
in deportation hearings might result in the continua-
tion of a crime - the illegal presence of an alien in
the United States. 7 Though "[t]he constable's blun-
der may allow the criminal to go free ... we have
never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue
in the commission of an ongoing crime."8
Although the Lopez-Mendoza Court held that
the exclusionary rule could not be invoked in a de-
portation hearing involving an ordinary Fourth
Amendment violation, it specifically left open the
question of whether courts could apply the rule
when there was an egregious violation of the Fourth
Amendment or general INS practice.'9 In deciding
to apply the exclusionary rule in Gonzalez-Rivera,
the Ninth Circuit fleshed out the Lopez-Mendoza
exception. The Gonzalez-Rivera court determined
that the violation of Gonzalez's Fourth Amendment
rights was egregious. Hence, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the BIA's decision to allow the evidence.
H. Egregious Violations
According to the Gonzalez-Rivera court, a stop
based solely on Hispanic appearance is an egregious
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court, cit-
ing Adamson v. CILR.,20 noted that "bad faith" viola-
tions are egregious. The Gonzalez-Rivera court ex-
plained that Lopez-Mendoza did not limit the scope
of egregious violations to physical brutality.2' "In-
stead, under Ninth Circuit law, all 'bad faith viola-
tions of an individual's fourth amendment rights'
are considered sufficiently egregious to 'require[]
I Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
I2 Id. (quoting US. v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 446).
,3 Id. at 1041.
14 Id. at 1048.
,s Id. at 1049.
26 Id.
7 Id. at 1047.
8 d.
'Id. at 1050.The Lopez-Mendoza Court cited Rochin
v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), as an example of
an egregious violation. In Rochin, the arresting officers
forced the defendant to vomit in order to recover evi-
dence of narcotics. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 165. Conduct such
as this is an egregious violation because it shocks the con-
science. Id. at 172.
20 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
21 Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1449.
application of the exclusionary sanction in a civil
... proceeding."'P
The Adamson court had established a "reason-
ableness" standard of "bad faith." According to the
Gonzalez-Rivera court, such a standard is the ap-
propriate means to judge a race-based stop such as
this.?1 Reliance on race or ethnicity as evidence of
illegal conduct is "analogous to a facial racial classi-
fication" and thus an"impermissile use[] of race"., 4
Second, the INS officers, trained in Fourth Amend-
ment law, should have known a race-based stop was
unconstitutional. Their "subsequent rationalization"
of their stop "compounds the gravity of their ac-
tions."1s Third, an objective standard of reasonable-
ness is appropriate because it requires no reliance
on the "level of self-awareness [or racial motivations]
of a particular officer."26
The Gonzalez-Rivera court rejected the INS ar-
gument that in order for a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation to be egregious, it has to undermine the pro-
bative value of the evidence in addition to being
fundamentally unfair. The court determined that
under Lopez-Mendoza and Ninth Circuit law, "a fun-
damentally unfair Fourth Amendment violation is
considered egregious regardless of the probative
value of the evidence obtained."
2 7
In Gonzalez-Rivera, the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that stopping an individual solely on the ba-
sis of Hispanic appearance is egregious and a "bad
faith" violation of the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures. INS
officers could not reasonably have believed that a
race-based stop was constitutional. The stop oc-
curred after the INS had implemented policy pro-
hibiting such conduct and after United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce28 had deemed such conduct uncon-
stitutional. Under an objective standard of reason-
ableness, the Border Patrol could only have stopped
Gonzalez in bad faith.z9
2 Id. (quoting Adamson, 745 F.2d at 545 n.1).
23 Id. at 1449.
24 Id. at 1450. Judge Tang, concurring in Gonzalez-
Rivera, stressed the importance of applying the exclusion-
ary rule to counter racism. The rule "serves the essential
function of preserving judicial integrity." Id. at 1452.
25 Id. at 1450.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1451.
28 422 U.S. 873 (1975)(holding that Hispanic ap-
pearance by itself is insufficient to justify a stop by the
Border Patrol).
29 Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 E3d at 1450-51.
30 Id. at 1453.
31 Id.
The dissent, while agreeing that the INS' prima
facie claim was untimely and that the Border Patrol
relied on inconclusive suspicions to stop Gonzalez,
nonetheless disagreed with the majority's conclu-
sion that the use of the exclusionary rule was ap-
propriate in this case. The dissent concluded that
Gonzalez' stop was not significantly different from
the acceptable INS behavior in Lopez-Mendoza.30
Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the Lopez-
Mendoza Court did not decide that courts could
apply the exclusionary rule in the case of an egre-
gious violation of the Fourth Amendment?' Accord-
ing to the dissent, the Lopez-Mendoza Court limited
its holding to a non-egregious Fourth Amendment
violation.
The dissent further argued that the majority in
Gonzalez-Rivera should have looked at the entire
opinion and its goals instead of focusing on dicta
relating to a possible exception.32 The dissent con-
sidered the difference in the balance between social
costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule
in Gonzalez-Rivera and Lopez-Mendoza to be mini-
mal at best.3
According to the dissent, Benitez-Mendez v. INS 4
was more on point than Adason. In Benitez-Mendez,
the court did not apply the exclusionary rule in a
deportation hearing even though the Border Patrol
was unable to "articulate objective facts providing a
reasonable suspicion that [the petitioner] was an
alien illegally in this country."35 The dissent argued
that Benitez-Mendez was dispositive and was
unpersuaded by the majority's attempt to distinguish
the two cases.
36
The dissent postulated that injunctive relief
aimed at the type of behavior found in this case
might be a better solution than use of the exclu-
sionary rule. "By advancing down this path in lieu of
the majority's, we would establish a fuller, better
documented record on which to revisit the alterna-
32 Id.
33 Id.The dissent did not condone the race-based stop
involved in this case, but only argued that the factors con-
sidered in Lopez-Mendoza were equally relevant in the cur-
rent case. Id.
3 760 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1985).
31 Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 E3d at 1453-1454 (quoting
Benitez-Mendez, 760 F.2d at 909).
36 Id. at 1454. The majority distinguished Benitez-
Mendez because the petitioner in Benitez-Mendez had not
alleged a race-based stop or that this would have consti-
tuted an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 1451 n.1. The majority could have further distin-
guished Benitez-Mendez. In Benitez-Mendez, the INS was
unable to articulate objective facts to support the arrest
tive limitation on the holding in Lopez-Mendoza to
be triggered 'if there developed good reason to be-




The Ninth Circuit is the only court to refer to
the egregious violation exception and then actually
apply it to a deportation hearing. Other cases have
so there was only an implication of racial motivation. In
Gonzalez-Rivera, on the other hand, the INS testified af-
firmatively that race was the primary basis for the stop
and the U made a judicial finding of fact on this issue. A
referred to the exception, but have not applied it.38
This case is highly unusual because the INS admit-
ted the racial motivation for the Gonzalez' stop. It
is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit will extend its
reasoning in Gonzalez-Rivera to cases involving only
implicit racial motivation.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Michael J.B. Schaff
further distinction is that the Benitez-Mendez court does
not mention the egregious violation exception.
17 Id. at 1453 (quoting Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1050).
38 See supra note 8.
